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Map of Somalia and Horn of Africa 
 
Somalia. Bing Maps. Microsoft. July 13, 2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.bing.com/maps/#Y3A9LTAuNDgwNjg3fjU3LjQxOTQzMiZsdmw9NSZzdHk9YiZxPVNvbWFsaWE= 
 HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia,  
Greater HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan  
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Part I: Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. 
 
Somalia Conflict/ Security Situation Overview 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Clarke, Walter S. “Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93.” SSI Special 
Report AD-A259 777.  Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. (approved for 
public release) http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a259777.pdf 
This report provides and in-depth history of Somalia starting with its independence and 
providing information on clan history and organization, domestic politics, historical figures 
and then concludes with a thorough list of significant dates in Somali history along a 
chronology of Operation Restore Hope (pre-Mogadishu intervention)  
MAPS REPORTS AND DATASETS 
“Country Report: Somalia.” Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset.  April 2013. 
http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ACLED-Country-
Report_Somalia_April-2013.pdf 
This report reviews the impact of al-Shabaab and its areas of operation and the level of 
conflict in different regions.  It also presents the issues of communal conflict.  The challenges 
of the local government are examined with concern to the establishment of local 
administration.  
 
Zimmerman, Katherine. "Somalia Conflict Maps:Islamist and Political." AEI: Critical Threats. May 
31, 2010. http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalia-conflict-maps-islamist-and-political. 
 The maps from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) featured in this article present the locations 
of three particular Islamist groups in Somalia; al Shabaab, Hizb al Islam and Ahlu Sunna wa al 
Jama’a and the different self-declared regions.    
 
U.S. Department of State. ( N.D)  “U.S.  Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets.” U.S. Department of State. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/index.htm 
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The U.S. State Department fact sheets provide information on U.S. relations with the 
particular country and any aid provided and U.S. representation in the country.  
POLITICAL HISTORY AND U.S. POLICIES 
Bruton, Bronwyn E. “Somalia: A New Approach.” Council Special Report.  Council on Foreign 
Relations. March 2010. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421  
This report outlines the political history involving the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) and al- Shabaab.   It evaluates the U.S. policies regarding the country and the 
effectiveness of its support of the TFG.  The author describes a series of strategies to combat 
terrorism in the region and to stabilize and develop the country.  
 
CULTURE AND CLAN IDENTITY  
Center for Security, Armed Forces and Society. “Somalia.” CEADS Papers, 2 (2012). 
http://www.csfas.net/downloads/ceads_volume_2_-_ansa_in_somaila.pdf     
This collection consists of five different papers on Somali culture, clan structure, and 
religion, especially as they relate to non-state violence.  Titles include, “Clan Identity and 
Islamic Identity in Somalia: An Examination of Non-State Armed Groups in Regional and 
Sub-Regional Context” and “Legitimacy Among the Somali: The Importance of Clan and 
Islamic Identities in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Any Eventual Solution.”  
 
GROWTH/ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
“Somalia’s Islamists.” Africa Report 100 (December 2005) International Crisis Group. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/somalia/Somalias%20Islamists.pdf 
This report from 2005 details the rise and expansion of political Islamism and the growth of 
several groups, some more radical than others and the Sharia Court systems,  that would pave 
the way for al-Shabaab.  The rise and collapse of al-Ittihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) resulted in a 
few members establishing a new jihadi network with ties to al-Qaeda.  It also discusses how 
the Islamist groups were able to coordinate several different clans who had been at odds with 
each other for a long time.   
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CONFLICT REPORTS 
Fergusson, James. The World’s Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. Boston, 
MA: Da Capo Press, 2013.  
An in-depth recounting by James Ferguson, an imbedded journalist in Somalia, of his time in 
Somalia observing the  AMISOM military forces fight against Al-Shabaab.   He covers a 
wide variety of topics and provides a “front-line” look at the conflict.  The book provides a 
history into the conflict, interviews with many AMISOM soldiers, civilians, and local 
journalists,      
Historical Context 
RUSSIA AND SOMALIA 
Painter, David S. Cold War: An International History, Routledge, 1999. 
This article discusses the aid provided to Somalia by the Soviets beginning in the 1960s. The 
main objective of the aid was to strengthen the Soviets’ presence in the Indian Ocean by using 
the port of Berbera. Somali forces invaded Ogaden in July 1977 after the U.S. pledged to 
supply defensive weapons in the quest for a ‘Greater Somalia’. In November 1977, Soviets 
sent military equipment, advisors, and Cuban troops into Ethiopia. Ogaden, the desert region 
in Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis, remained a center of the separatist insurgency.  
 
Khapoya, Vincent B. and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, The Cold War and Regional Politics in East 
Africa, 1985. https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/14668/15737  
Soviet-Somali relations emerged from Siad Barre’s 1969 coup. By 1972, Soviet aid grew to 
$50 million, a significant increase from $35 million in 1963. The soviets shifted their support 
to Ethiopia in 1974 when the emperor was overthrown. Somalia used the Ethiopian emperor’s 
death as a chance to seize Ogaden, the southeastern province of Ethiopia. The U.S. was 
permitted access to the Soviet-built air and naval stations in Berbera by mid-1980. 
 
SIAD BARRE  
Castro, Alfonso Peter. “Cousins and gunmen.” World and I 9,  no. 3 (March 1994): 268. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9407062371&site=ehost-
live 
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 This article provides a look at the crisis in Somalia with particular focus on the dictatorship of 
Siad Barre and his experiments with socialism, “modernization” removal of the tribal/clan 
system and harsh repression of any opponents while simultaneously ensuring that his clan and 
its allies were in a position of power.  It concludes with information on programs to rebuild the 
economy and agriculture as well as a need to disarm the various militias and tribal groups.  
CIVIL WAR AND SECESSIONS  
Bakonya, Jutta. “Moral Economies of Mass Violence:Somalia 1988-1991.” Civil War 11, no 4. 
(December 2009): 434-454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240903403790 
 This article is covers that start and growth of the Somali war between 1988 and 1992. It then 
examines the expansion of the war to different regions and the mass-upheaval in Mogadishu 
1990/91. The role of clan-affiliation and its impact on the spread of violence and their role in 
insurgent groups. 
 
Balthasar, Dominik. “The Wars in the North and the Creation of Somaliland.”  World Peace 
Foundation. October 28, 2013. http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/28/the-wars-in-
the-north-and-the-creation-of-somaliland/ 
This report covers the Somali Civil War and the continuous conflicts throughout the 1980’s 
and into the 90’s culminating with the creation of Smaliland.    
 
TNG AND TFG 
 
Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 247-272. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876279  
This article examines the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG). The TNG emerged from the May-Aug 2000 Somali National 
Peace Conference in Arta. Delegates adopted a provisional constitution and a Transitional 
National Assembly of 225 people. The TFG was declared in 2004 and Abdullahi Yusuf was 
elected as president in October 2004. His pro-Ethiopian and anti-Islamist stances sparked 
hardline Islamists to organize a support base. Al-Shabaab engaged in political assassinations 
targeting TFG collaborators and hostilities against the Western-backed government in 
Mogadishu began to rise. Due to the inability of both the TNG and TFG to extend its authority 
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throughout Somalia, warlords continued to control portions of territory throughout the 
country.  
U.S. AND SOMALIA AND U.S. INTERVENTION  
OVERVIEW AND POLICIES 
 
Schraeder, Peter J. “U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa amidst the end of the Cold War.” Africa 
Today 40, no 2. (2
nd
 Quarter 1993):7. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=9311080970&site=ehost-
live 
This in-depth article provides a look at U.S. policies regarding Somalia during the Cold War 
and how they shifted from a hands-off, limited involvement into direct military intervention 
following a UN humanitarian initiative.  The article moves on to further evaluate the decisions 
and results regarding U.S. intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the impact they might 
make on future U.S. involvement in the region. 
 
 OPERATION RESTORE HOPE  
“Humanitarian mission to Somalia.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 49: 855. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9301250310&site=ehost-
live 
Address by President George Bush describing the need for an intervention in Somalia, the 
goals of the coalition forces and the limited mission duration. 
 
Cooling, Norman L. "Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia: A Tactical Action Turned Strategic 
Defeat." Marine Corps Gazette 85, no. 9 (09, 2001): 92-106, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/221430576?accountid=322 
This source begins by providing an overview of the critical events that led Somalia to the 
point where foreign intervention was needed.  It then gives a thorough description of the 
events of the U.S. role in Mogadishu, the tactical plan, intelligence, the execution of the raid,  
command and control and lessons learned.  
Dworken, Jonathan T. “Rules of engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope.” Military Review 74, no. 9 
(September 1994): 26. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9411220389&site=ehost-
live 
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This article examines concerns and issues regarding the Rules of Engagement utilized by U.S. 
forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope and the lessons learned from them.  It also 
provides a brief overview of the situation that warranted the operation and the threats faced.   
 
UNION OF ISLAMIC COURTS 
OVERVIEW/PROFILE 
“Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts.” BBC News, June 6, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm 
This brief profile gives an introduction into the 11 Islamic courts making up the Union of 
Islamic Courts/Islamic Courts Union.  As of June 2006, relatively soon after the courts had 
come to power, the article describes the courts’ perception in Somalia, their role, and possible 
radical links.    
 
Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan. “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.” Journal of 
eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 151-160.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050701452382 
 The history and the origins of the Islamic courts are provided in this  article, tracing them 
from their origins in 1990 until their destruction in 2007.  While the courts provided some 
form of law and order in Mogadishu, their harsh tactics and extremist leanings led to their 
downfall at the hands of an Ethiopian invasion.  
 
UIC/ICU AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo. “The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance in Somalia.” African 
Security Review 19, no. 1 (March 2010): 88-84. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=53466404&site=ehost-live 
This article discusses the role that the Union of Islamic Courts played in provided public 
services and local security versus that of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  The 
TFG was designed to serve as a coalition government consisting of members from four of the 
largest Somali clans and a combination of representatives from a collection of smaller clans.  
The UIC originated in clan courts and was run by Islamic clerics.  The Supreme Council 
which oversaw the courts persuaded different groups to assign members to form a combined 
militia force.  This militia force was integral in defeated the rival warlords and led to the 
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growth of the courts and sharia law along with the growth and radicalization of the militia.  
While the courts sought to purvey some sense of order, their aggressive morality policing and 
harsh punishments caused the general populace to feel that their fundamental rights and 
freedoms were being violated and led to the UIC’s undoing.    
 
LOCAL SUPPORT OF THE COURTS 
Samatar, Abdi Ismail. Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, US Warlordism, and AU Shame, Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 111, Debates on the left in Southern Africa (March 2007), 
pp. 155-165. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20406369 
This article examines the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)’s reaction to the UN Security 
Council’s authorization of a peacekeeping force in Somalia. That author argues against the 
invasion and claims that the UIC provided a  more stable and less corrupt system of 
government , and that Somalia did not need foreign intervention.  The UIC’s lightly armed 
militia and the chaotic internal organization in Somalia allowed for U.S.- and British-backed 
Ethiopian forces to overtake territories from insurgents in Mogadishu. 
 
WARLORDS VS. UIC/ICU 
Hirsch, Michael., and Jeffrey Bartholet. “ Fighting in the Shadows.” Newsweek 147, no. 23 (June 5, 
2006): 36-38.  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=20968787&site=ehost-live 
This article covers the fight for control of Mogadishu that took place between the armed wing 
of the Islamic Courts Union, aka Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the secular Warlords who 
supposedly received U.S. support.   
GOVERNANCE/FAILED STATE  
LACK OF FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT 
Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia.” International Security 31, no. 3 
(Winter 2006): 74-106. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=23814988&site=ehost-live 
This in-depth report examines the lack of a fully functioning government in Somalia since 
1991 and the events influencing this including a war with Ethiopia, an already crumbling 
infrastructure, the reduction and removal of Cold-War era foreign aid and a multi-year civil 
war.  Menkhaus covers the attempts to formulate a transitional federal government (TFG) and 
the role of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)/sharia courts and the Supreme Council of 
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Islamic Courts (SCIC) in undermining the TFG and seeking to insert their own brand of 
governance.  The original sharia courts were controlled by a coalition of local interests and 
operated within Somali customs as opposed to superseding them.   
 
Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups 
AL-SHABAAB 
GENERAL INFORMATION/OVERVIEW/BACKGROUNDER 
“Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
2060 (2012): Somalia. “ S/2013/413, United Nations Security Council. July 12, 2013.  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413 
This report from the UNSC provides a very in-depth look at al-Shabaab, its tactics, goals, 
finances, leadership (as of 2013) and structure.  
Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC)  http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-
shabaab 
This website provided a wide variety of information on al-Shabaab, including its tactics, lists 
of its attacks and leaders and lots of multimedia.  The multimedia provides footage of 
propaganda, interviews, training camps, attacks, and news reports on their attacks.  A timeline 
of al-Shabaab’s attacks is also provided. 
 
Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005-2012. Oxford University Press, 2013. 
This book goes in-depth into the history of al-Shabaab, starting with its growth in the ICU and 
separation in 2007. This look at the group shows it as a hybrid organization that not only is an 
Islamic group but also a Somali nationalistic group by utilizing firsthand field research and 
interviews with al-Shabaab members.  
 
Masters, Jonathan. “Backgrounder: Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations.   July 9, 2013.  
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650  
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This background report provides an initial overview of Al-Shabab including its origins and an 
interactive timeline regarding the group’s development.   Also included are sections on Al-
Shabab’s leadership, tactics, motivation, and relationship with core Al Qaeda.   
Also see the timeline of al-Shabaab’s growth and development, starting with the founding of 
the ICU and  including CT programs against it and ending with the Westgate attack. 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468 
 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Harnisch, Christopher. “The Terror Threat From Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab.” 
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute. February 12, 2010. 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_Fro
m_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf 
This report from the American Enterprise Institute provides an in-depth look into the origins 
and aspects of al-Shabaab up to 2010.  Topics covered include the group’s origins, how it 
gained control, connections to al-Qaeda, international recruiting, threat level, and a timeline of 
attacks and assassinations conducted by or claimed by Al-Shabaab.   Early on in the document 
a list of ranking individuals associated with al-Shabaab and its affiliates is presented followed 
by a series of maps.   
 
OPERATIONS/TACTICS 
The National Counterterrorism Center. “Al-Shabaab.” National Counterterrorism Center 2014 
Calendar. (n.d.). http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html 
This page provides a concise overview of al Shabaab’s history, area of operations and 
associated attacks. The site also provides a map of Al-Shabaab’s locations and links to U.S. 
State Department Fact Sheets.  
Also see CNN and the BBC’s Q&As on the group:  
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/index.html  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689  
 
Crawford, Alex. “ ‘White Widow’ Lethwaite ‘Key’ in Al Shabaab.” Sky News, October 11, 2013. 
http://news.sky.com/story/1152971/white-widow-lewthwaite-key-in-al-shabaab  
 13 
 
This article summarizes the contents of a 35-page Kenyan intelligence report on Al Shabaab.  
It describes the report as giving a detailed description of how Al Shabaab operates throughout 
Africa along with how it recruits and utilizes cells in different countries across the continent. 
The article also notes Kenyan intelligence’s identification of the British “white widow” 
Samantha Lethwaite  and her involvement with an Al-Shabaab terror cell.  This cell is co-
ordinated by Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir.  
 
Bergen, Peter. “How Al-Shabaab Picks Its Targets.” CNN, September 23, 2013. 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/opinion/al-shabaab-aims/index.html  
 
Frames Shabaab’s September 2013 attack of an upscale mall in Nairobi as consistent with the 
group’s anti-Western agenda, hostility toward Kenya, and desire to remain relevant. For more 
on the significance of the Nairobi attack, see this NYT article, which underscores Shabaab’s 
fractured organizational structure and weakened operational capabilities inside Somalia: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/world/africa/kenya-mall-carnage-shows-shabab-
resilience.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  
 
ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT 
Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo.  “State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.” 
Politics, Religion, & Ideology 13, no. 4 (December 2012):  513-527. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=83933546&site=ehost-live 
This article explores the relationship between the collapse of local government, and the 
following void allowing for the growth and entrenchment of Al-Shabaab.  During this period 
Al-Shabaab has sought to delegitimize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and 
legitimize their organization.  Al-Shabaab utilized Somali nationalism, Islamism as politics, 
propaganda, and social services in order to makes themselves appear as a viable alternative to 
the TFG.  There is a thorough analysis of “Salafi” Islamism and how it is utilized by groups to 
legitimize their actions. The development and role of Al-Shabaab’s precursors such as the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Al-Ittihaad Al-Islamiah (AIAI) are examined and 
discussed as well, especially Al-Shabaab’s role as a militaristic youth group in the UIC.          
LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS 
 
KAMPALA 
Pippard, Tim. “Al-Shabab’s Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks.” CTC Sentinel. 
July 3, 2010. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-shabab%E2%80%99s-agenda-in-the-wake-
of-the-kampala-suicide-attacks 
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 Al-Shabaab conducted a multi-pronged attack in the Ugandan capital of Kampala in an effort 
to prove its worth to al-Qaeda and expands its presence to the greater Horn of Africa, outside 
of its normal operating areas. These outside attacks are seen as a movement of the group to 
advance itself from a local, nationalistic group to a global forced focused on jihad.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTACKS ON UN COMPOUND IN JUNE 2013 IN MOGADISHU 
Yusuf, Mohammed. “Al-Shabab Gunmen Attack UN Compound in Mogadishu.” VOA, June 19, 
2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/alshabab-gunmen-attack-un-compound-in-
mogadishu/1684664.html 
An attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu that killed at least 15 people was led off by a 
suicide attack and then followed by a direct assault by al-Shabaab.  Following the attack, fire 
was exchanged for several hours between al-Shabaab and U.N. security forces. A few months 
prior, al-Shabaab had killed 30 people in an attack on the Supreme Court complex in 
Mogadishu.  
 
WESTGATE MALL 
Howden, Daniel. “Terror in Westgate Mall: The Full Story of the Attacks That Devastated Kenya,” 
The Guardian. October 4, 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-terror 
This article presents a succinct overview of the 80-hour siege by al-Shabaab militants at the 
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Interviews with survivors, their relatives, and members of 
the Kenyan security forces detail infighting and incompetence among the authorities. A clash 
of egos among Kenyan authorities impaired a swift response to neutralize the insurgents, 
highlighting the need for security sector reform and improving the mobilization of assets 
within the Kenyan security forces. 
 
FEBRUARY 2014 ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL PALACE 
Nor, Omar and Laura Smith-Spark. “Al-Shabaab militants attack Somali presidential palace in 
Mogadishu.” CNN, February 21, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/africa/somalia-
attack/ 
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Following similar tactics, al-Shabaab used an explosion to breach the gate and exchanged fire 
with security forces.  Somalia’s security minister, Adbikarin Hussein Guled stated that at least 
12 people were killed in the attack but out of this number, seven were al-Shabaab members.  
 
MAY 14 ATTACK ON A RESTAURANT IN DJIBOUTI 
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Henry Appel. “Al-Shabaab Strikes in Djibouti.” War on the Rocks. 
June 3, 2014.  
On May 24, 2014 a man and a woman detonated explosives they had hidden under their clothes 
at a restaurant in Djibouti popular with NATO members and other peacekeeping forces.  One 
person was killed and 11 were wounded.  This was the first suicide bombing in the history of 
Djibouti.  The article describes when Djibouti is significant militarily in the fight against al-
Shabaab and shows the growth in al-Shabaab attacks outside of Somalia in 2014.  
 
JUNE 2014 ATTACK AND SIEGE IN MPEKETONI KENYA  
“Kenya attack: Mpeketoni near Lamu hit by al-Shabab raid.” BBC, June 16, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27862510 
Members of al-Shabaab attacked Mpeketoni in force.  At least 48 people were killed during the 
attacks in which al-Shabaab throw bombs into buildings and restaurants and systematically 
executed Christians and Kenyans.  Many people were out in town watching the world cup 
games.  
GARISSA UNIVERSITY  
Hatcher, Jessica and Kevin Sieff. “Al-Shabab attacks Kenyan university, killing at least 147.” 
Washington Post, April 2, 2015.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/70-killed-
hundreds-rescued-after-kenya-university-attack-by-al-shabab-militants/2015/04/02/0c554516-
d951-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html 
The attack on Garissa University in Kenya conducted by al-Shabaab in April of 2015 resulted 
in the deaths of over 140 students. Reports indicate that at least 79 students were injured 
during the attack. Gunmen, four in total, stormed the dormitories in the early morning and all 
four were killed after a 15 hour long siege by security forces.  There had been initial threats 
made in the past by al-Shabaab that they were going to attack the university and students had 
been evacuated in the past due to the potential threat.        
Sheikh, Abdi., and Feisal Omar. “Al Shabaab militants attack Somali army base, say dozens dead.” 
Reuters, January 15, 2016.  
 16 
 
http://in.reuters.com/article/somalia-attacks-idINKCN0UT0EY   
 
Al-Shabaab attacked a Somali army base, housing African Union (AMISOM) peacekeeping 
forces, in the town of Ceel Cadde near the border with Kenya. The base was overrun and 
AMISOM forces are counterattacking while in turn, Al-Shabaab claims to have killed 60 
AMISOM soldiers. With the loss of the base, also came the loss of almost 30 trucks and 
armored vehicles.   
    
 
 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA/ONLINE PRESENCE / PROPAGANDA 
“Al-Shabab showed gruesome social media savvy during attack.” CBS/AP, September 24, 2013. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-shabab-showed-gruesome-social-media-savvy-during-
attack/  
This article describes the group’s use of Twitter during its attack on the Westgate Mall in 
Nairobi. It reports that Shabaab militants sent out numerous tweets taunting the Kenyan 
military, praising the attack and threatening more violence. It notes that the group repeatedly 
started a new feed each time the social media company shut down its account and tailored its 
messages to specific audiences.  Tweets were sent out in both Somali and English. These 
actions are seen to be consistent with the group’s “aggressively public” posture.   
Also see this Long War Journal article outlining the differences between authentic and 
inauthentic Shabaab tweets http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/09/are_you_looking_at_an_official.php  
INTERNAL DIVISIONS/SETBACKS 
Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. and Hussain Solomon. “Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab’s Losses in 
Somalia.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. September 26, 2012. 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/factors-responsible-for-al-shababs-losses-in-somalia  
This article examines what the author sees as the three primary factors behind al-Shabab’s 
setbacks.  These factors are the successful model provided by AMISOM, clan rivalries within 
al-Shabab and al-Shabab’s mishandling of the regional drought in 2011.  It also identifies the 
challenges facing the Somali government as it begins to strengthen its position against al-
Shabab. 
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Hansen, Stig Jarle. “An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions.” CTC Sentinel. February 
24, 2014. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/an-in-depth-look-at-al-shababs-internal-divisions 
This article evaluates the results and implications of the infighting among Al-Shabab 
members. It also reviews the role Al-Shabaab plays in the local economy and its impact on 
and utilization of Tribal politics and rivalries.    
 
 
 
 
 
Rosen, Armin. “How Africa’s Most Threatening Terrorist Group Lost Control of Somalia.” The 
Atlantic,  
September 21, 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-africas-
most-threatening-terrorist-group-lost-control-of-somalia/262655/  
 
Brief piece outlining factors behind Shabaab’s 2011-2012 decline, including “famine, 
unprecedented African military cooperation, and [the group’s] own medieval rule.” 
 
“Somalia’s al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out.” The George Washington University: Homeland Security  
Policy Institute, HSPI Issue Brief 22, August 27, 2013. 
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief217_222_AfricaSecuritySeries.cfm  
 
Argues that internal divisions, alienation of the local population, and sustained CT efforts by 
domestic and international forces have significantly weakened the group, but that it remains a 
significant threat to Somalian security.  Provides information on the group’s rise and its 
relationship with various Somali clans, as well as its governance structures (including the 
organization’s internal power struggles), messaging strategies, and links with outside groups.  
(check to see if duplicated) 
LEADERS/HIGH PROFILE MEMBERS 
AHMED GODANE (MUKHTAR ABU ZUBAIR) (KILLED 2014) 
Anzalone, Christopher. "The Life and Death of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane." CTC Sentinel. 
September 29, 2014.  https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-life-and-death-of-al-shabab-leader-
ahmed-godane. 
This article provides a background on Ahmed Godane, Al-Shabab’s leader until his death in 
September of 2014.  Godane studied in Sudan and Pakistan and was believed to have been 
turned to militant Islam during his time in Pakistan.  Godane’s involvement in the Islamic 
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Courts Union and rise to leadership saw the expansion of al-Shabab’s territorial control.  In 
conclusion, the article speculates whether al-Shabab will dissolve due to the lack of Godane’s 
leadership 
 
AHMED UMAR (ABU UBAIDAH) 
West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab to Face Different Direction after Appointment of New Leader.” 
Terrorism Monitor. 12, no. 21 (2014): The Jamestown Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43060&tx_ttne
ws%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=52620b3e9602e94d93816058fb04a416#.VH4b9DHF98E 
This article describes al-Shabaab’s new leader, Shaykh Ahmad Umar (a.k.a Abu Ubaidah) and 
speculates what his impact on the group will be. The policies of the previous leader, Godane, 
are reviewed and the attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab are included. The article concludes by 
stating that Umar has not indicated a new direction for al-Shabaab yet, but he will have to 
manage the clan politics within the group in order to continue operations. 
 
MOHAMED ABDIKADIR MOHAMED (IKRIMA) 
Cruickshank, Paul and Tim Lister. “U.S. target in Somalia: An inside story on an Al-Shabaab 
commander.” CNN, October 7, 2013.  ihttp://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/somalia-
al-shabaab-commander/ 
This article provides a background on Mohamed Abdikadir Mohamed (Ikrima) and his 
alleged involvement in different operations including recruiting in Kenya and allegedly in 
Europe.   
 
ADDITIONAL PROFILES 
Al Shabaab leadership Profiles.  Critical Threats.  American Enterprise  Institute. 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaab-leadership 
 A collection of profiles on several  key figures in al-Shabaab leadership. 
 
West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab Leader’s Fires Audio Message Suggests Morale is Low Among Somali 
Militants.” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 16 (August 5, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45713&tx_ttnews%5BbackPi
d%5D=7&cHash=229f889655d8b23785f1bef0b5620cc3  
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Al-Shabaab leader, Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, had re-emerged after almost two 
years of silence to a message of inspiration to his forces which have been facing defeats at 
the hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A unique aspect of this 
message was the specific labeling of Turkey as an enemy of al-Shabaab and Somalia. While 
claiming Turkey has invaded Somalia, it has been involved in reconstruction work and aiding 
displaced persons. In response to its setbacks, al-Shabaab has shifted its tactics to included 
VBIED attacks which has allowed for some successful attacks against AMISOM bases.    
PUSHBACK AND RESURGENCE  
Meservey,Joshua. “Al Shabab’s Resurgence: Why its Campaign of Terror will Likely Accelerate.” 
Foreign Affairs. January 3, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2017-01-
03/al-shabab-s-resurgence  
 
Al-Shabaab has mainly relegated itself to the southern regions of Somalia and launching 
strikes into Kenya as well. After coordinated CVE efforts against them and a minor schism 
over AQAP vs. ISIS allegiance, the group had undergone a temporary setback.  In the summer 
of 2016 Al-Shabaab launched a new series of attacks targeting military and government 
officials. The goals of these attacks were to disrupt the elections for parliamentary positions 
and the president and to find a new haven in the north.  A disrupted election process keeps the 
country in chaos and allows Al-Shabaab to claim the legal government if illegitimate. The 
push into the north serves the dual-purpose of providing an escape route for Al-Shabaab as 
they face more defeats in the south and establishing a stronghold to launch attacks against the 
schism Al-Shabaab group that pledged to ISIS. Another concerning factor of the push north is 
the renewed attempts at making a stronger connection with AQAP in Yemen. A direct line to 
AQAP could give Al-Shabaab the resources it needs to re-solidify its presence in the south.       
Al-Shabaab in Neighboring Countries 
KENYA 
AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT FACTORS 
Botha, Anneli. “Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization Among Individuals who Joined 
al-Shabaab in Kenya. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 11 (2014): 895-919. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.952511 
The increasing presence of al-Shabaab in Kenya has led to enhanced CT efforts and growing 
local concern.  Following two separate attacks in 2014 Kenyan authorities rounded up several 
thousand “Somali looking” individuals in an attempt to identify any members of or persons 
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sympathetic to al-Shabaab.  This article evaluates the impact of that particular tactic and 
several other factors and the roles they could play in increased radicalization.  The role of 
peers/friends is seen to have played a significant role in the growth of al-Shabaab in Kenya 
based on a survey conducted there.  The results show that  71% joined with their friends and 
54% of existing members worked to recruit their friends with only 6% joining with their 
family and 23% joined of their own accord.  In addition, the results show that introduction to 
al-Shabaab was mainly through friends, 38% however, 34% stated that they were introduced 
to the group by a religious figure.  The factor of the local economy or the lack there of is a 
frequent area of CT research , however, according to the figures in Anneli’s report, 87% of 
Kenyans who joined al-Shabaab cited religion as their reason for joining while only 4% cited 
economic reasons.  
 
West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Officials.” Terrorism 
Monitor 14, no. 1 (January 7, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44951&tx_ttnews%5BbackPi
d%5D=7&cHash=dacdb46fa2777f715aae13d3e578a0b3 
 
Al-Shabaab’s recruiting tactics have changed as its position has changed due to increased 
success of the AMISOM mission against them.  Al-Shabaab initially focused on poor areas 
and recruited youth with few options by offering them money and a form of employment.  
The same concept is being applied but to a different group who are also in need of those two 
incentives, students. College students and recent graduates (mainly in Kenya) have served as 
susceptible targets for recruitment since they are offered a salary and upkeep costs for their 
family.  Al-Shabaab has expressed interest in developing chemical weapons and this may be 
an aspect of their luring in students with engineering and chemistry backgrounds.   
 
 
CVE/POLICE TACTICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON RECRUITMENT 
Iaccino, Ludovica. “Al-Shabaab’s Ranks Swelling Thanks to Kenyan Police Brutality Towards 
Somali Migrants.”  International Business Times, June 5, 2015.  http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/al-
shabaads-ranks-swelling-thanks-kenyan-police-brutality-towards-somali-migrants-1504064 
There is concern that harsh measures utilized by Kenyan police as part of counterterrorism 
tactics are resulting in more Somali youth becoming radicalized and joining al-Shabaab.  
Somali immigrants in Kenya report having been targeted by Kenyan forces and claim regular 
human rights abuses.  Officials in Garissa spoke out against photos taken of police officers 
beating Somalis and stated that those involved will face disciplinary action  upon confirmation 
of the incident.       
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“Kenyan Forces Accused of Smuggling Racket in Somalia.” VOA, November 12, 2015.  
http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-forces-deny-smuggling-racket-somalia/3054543.html  
 
Kenyan Defense Forces are claimed by regional group, Journalists for Justice, to be involved 
in a smuggling operation involving the illicit sale and transportation of charcoal and sugar.  A 
similar operation was carried out by al-Shabaab and all imports of both sugar and charcoal 
were banned from Somalia in an attempt to stem this and crack down on smuggling.  Kenyan 
Defense Forces have a base in the port of Kismayu and reportedly have been using this base 
as a staging area for smuggling potentially making up to $50 million a year and the untracked 
funds could go to financing the very group they are fighting.  
 
 
 
 
TANZANIA 
 
Bariyo, Nicholas. “Tanzania Raid Nets 11 With Al-Shabaab Links.” The Wall Street Journal, October 
9, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579125542093731738  
 
Describes an Oct. 2013 counter-terrorism raid in Tanzania’s southern Mtwara region.  Reports 
that local security forces arrested 11 men, suspected Uamsho militants carrying Shabaab 
training manuals and assault rifles, who Tanzanian authorities say were planning an attack on 
Chinese construction workers in the area. Notes that some Tanzanians doubt their 
government’s attempt to link Uamsho (a separatist movement comprised of Tanzanian 
Muslims) and Shabaab, and argue instead that local security forces are on edge and quick to 
make arrests because of popular opposition to the Chinese-funded natural gas pipeline under 
construction in the country 
Foreign Fighters 
OVERVIEW/COMMON ORIGINS OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
Vidino, Lorenzo, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann.  “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of 
Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” African 
Security 3, no. 4 (October 2010): 216-238. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=55474511&site=ehost-live 
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This report looks at how al-Shabaab used the conflict in Somalia to present their ideals and 
goals as a form of religious obligation or sacred activity in order to garner additional support 
and financing.  The history leading up to and the forming of al-Shabaab is briefly covered 
along with its ideology and then a section on the origins of foreign fighters.  The United 
States, Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden are all mentioned with regards to the 
numbers and actions of recent immigrants and citizens who joined or tried to join al-Shabaab. 
The report concludes with examining whether the motives of foreign fighters were religious or 
nationalistic.    
 
“Briton Thomas Evans Among al-Shabab Fighters Killed in Kenya.” BBC,  June 15, 2015.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-33133896 
British born Thomas Evans, converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdul Hakim.  He 
initially tried to travel to Kenya and was turned back by airport police but he then traveled to 
Egypt and was able to make his way to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab.  Evans was killed in 
an attack on a Kenyan military base. There are believed to be at least 50 British citizens 
fighting for al-Shabaab.   
 
Dickey, Christopher. “Nairobi Mall Attack: Al Shabaab’s Scandinavian Connection.” Newsweek, 
October 19, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/19/nairobi-mall-attack-al-
shabaab-s-scandinavian-connection.html  
 
Reports that a Norwegian citizen, 23-year-old Hassan Abdi Dhuhulow, may have been among 
the militants responsible for the Sept. 2013 Westgate attack. Mentions other Islamist militants 
with ties to Scandinavia.  Frames Dhuhulow as “typical of what counter-terrorism analysts 
call ‘generation 1.5’ immigrants—born abroad, but raised from early childhood in their new 
countries. As teenagers, many are unsure of their identities, their allegiances and their futures, 
and thus become easy prey for recruiters from Al-Shabaab or other radical organizations who 
claim to give them a purpose in life, even if that is only an early death as a suicide bomber.” 
Also see this brief report on the BBC’s list of 47 Britons with links to Shabaab and similar 
organizations: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24639648 
 
PURGE OF FOREIGN RECRUITS 
Pantucci, Raffaello, and A.R. Sayyid. “Foreign Fighters in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s Internal Purge.” 
Terrorism Monitor, December 03, 2014. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=94400048&site=ehost-live 
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(update this description) The article reports on the released of a video entitle "It's an eye for an 
eye: The Woolwich attacks." The video features 10 British jihadis who had died fighting 
alongside al-Shabaab organization and one Somali-Norwegian carrying out the massacre at 
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. It confirms the role of foreign firefighters inside the East 
African terrorist network. 
 
Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist  
Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11.” Santa, Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011.  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf  
 
(give a brief description) See pages 12-14 for discussion of al-Shabab’s recruitment of 
Somali-Americans.  Also see these pieces on the 2013 killing of Omar Hammami – “the 
Alabama-born ‘jihadist rapper’” – by his fellow Shabaab members: 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/omar-hammami-terrorist-
suspect-killed-in-somalia and 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/shabaab_kills_americ.php  
AL-HIJRA 
Nzes, Fredrick. “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate in Kenya.” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 5 (2014): 24. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-hijra-al-shababs-affiliate-in-kenya 
This article describes the formation of Al-Hijra in Kenya. This group started as counseling and 
community center in the form of the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) and over time formatted ties 
with Al-Shabab. According to the article, Al-Hijra has served as a fund raising and recruiting 
center for Al-Shabab, targeting Kenyan youths. The organization officially changed its name 
from the MYC to Al-Hijra in 2012.    
Finances/Smuggling/Criminal Activity 
SUGAR 
Boniface, Bosire. “Sugar Imports from Somalia Fund al-Shabaab, Kenyan Officials Say.” Sabahi, 
April 24, 2013. 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/24/feature-01  
This report discusses how al-Shabaab militants have compensated for their September 2012 
loss of Kismayo by posing as traders and selling Somali-produced sugar to Kenyan 
merchants. It is noted that much of the $1.2 billion/year trade is not declared to Kenyan 
customs officials and is used by Shabaab to smuggle weapons as well as raise revenue.  
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CHARCOAL 
Anderson, Jessica L.  “Forget Ivory, Africa’s al-Shabaab Terrorists Are Getting Rich on Coal in 
Somalia.” Defense One.  June 8, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/06/forget-
ivory-africas-al-shabaab-terrorists-are-getting-rich-coal-somalia/114673/?oref=d-river 
The threat of poaching and smuggling is a serious concern in East Africa and there are 
reported ties to ivory smuggling and al-Shabaab financing. These reports have been brought 
into question due to a lack of concrete evidence, however, charcoal have served  as a 
significant source of al-Shabaab financing for years.  Sales of charcoal to Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen and other areas have resulted in $38-$56 million in revenue 
annually.  Additional funds come from smuggling sugar and extorting taxes and fees from 
businesses.   
 
 
“The Charcoal Conundrum: Ending the Somali Illegal Charcoal Trade.”  The Global Initiative 
Against Transnational Organized Crime.  http://www.globalinitiative.net/somalia-charcoal/ 
Based on reports from the UN Security Council (UNSC), more than 40% of al-Shabaab’s 
funding comes from illegal charcoal sales. The charcoal is shipped from Somali ports through 
vessels that are registered to other States leading to the belief that this is a larger transnational 
issue.  There is also an environmental concern due to the resulting deforestation and 
desertification which hurts Somalia’s main export of livestock.  The UNSC placed sanctions 
on the importation of illegal Somali charcoal however these sanctions are regularly avoided.  
The article ends by offering advice on how to stop the illegal charcoal trade.      
 
Manson, Katrina. “UN Pushes Gulf to Cut Off al-Shabaab Economic Lifeline in Somalia.” Financial 
Times, September 13, 2013. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09fd06f4-1c61-11e3-a8a3-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2fiQ7wbM4  
The article describes UN efforts to pressure Gulf importers of Somali charcoal to stop doing 
business with Shabaab, reported to have earned more than $25 million from the charcoal trade 
in 2011 alone. (Subscription required)  
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DIASPORA FUNDING AND INTERNAL INCOME SOURCES 
Vilkko, Valter. “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extrication.”   Research Paper. 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.  March 2011. 
http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.pdf 
This report utilizes information taken from interview conducted with members of the Somali 
diaspora who are residing in Nairobi, Kenya.  Nairobi has become a major hub of Somali 
trade and economic activity.  The three areas of financial support that al-Shabaab receives 
from external factors are diaspora remittances, donations from international jihadist groups 
and monetary support from the state of Eritrea.  The report’s main focus is on funding through 
diaspora support.  Financial support comes from Somalis living in the U.S., Europe, other 
parts of Africa and the Middle East.  As of 2008, outside donations seem to be down due to 
the end of the Ethiopian occupation.  The most common way of providing financial support is 
through hawala money transfer companies.   Cash curriers are still used but to a lesser extent.  
Some businesses are believed to serve as direct funding sources for al-Shabaab.  The Eastleigh 
district of Nairobi is seen as a “little-Somalia” in Kenya and statements from those 
interviewed for the report claim that it is known to the locals which businesses provide funds 
to al-Shabaab, they just do not have fully concrete evidence and it would be dangerous to look 
for it.   A group of representatives from the Eastleigh district strongly denounce these claims 
and al-Shabaab.  Internal sources of financing for al-Shabaab come from taxation of homes 
and businesses and forcing businesses and aid groups to pay protection money, along with the 
Islamic charity tax called, zakat.  The trade port of Kismayo serves as a major source of 
income for al-Shabaab due to their shipping of illegal charcoal and sugar.   Piracy also serves 
as a source of income, not directly being conducted by al-Shabaab but by forcing pirates to 
provide them with a cut of their profits.   
 
Mezzofiore, Gianluca. “Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees to Fund Somalia’s al-Shabaab Islamist 
Fighters.” International Business Times, July 29, 2013. 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/495268/20130729/eritrea-shabaab-somalia-diaspora-tax-
horn-islam.htm  
This article reports that Eritrean citizens and refugees living in the UK are being forced to pay 
what is being called a diaspora tax by the Eritrean government. The money being taken from 
this 2% income tax is reportedly being used to fund militant groups including al- Shabaab.  
Many Eritreans in the UK do what they can to avoid paying this tax however tactics such as 
voiding travel documents or threatening relatives still in Eritrea are used by the Eritrean 
government to ensure payment. 
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IMPACT AND ROLE OF DRUGS IN FUNDING AND RECRUITMENT FOR AL-SHABAAB 
Kan, Paul Rexton. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare. Dullas, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.  2009. 
This book covers the production, sale, use and impact of various drugs on different conflicts 
around the world. Many irregular conflicts often tend to be fueled by both the drug trade and 
drug use.  Revenues from drug sales are used to pay for continuing the conflict and the drugs 
themselves are often taken before fighting or given afterwards as rewards.  In addition, they 
are used as a recruiting tool, either by offering criminals and addicts access to them or by 
drugging civilians and children and impressing them into service.   The role of the drug trade 
and the use of drugs in Somalia is discussed and examined in this book along with several 
other countries.   
 
 
POACHING/WILDLIFE SMUGGLING 
Stewart, Catrina.  “Illegal Ivory Trade Funds al-Shabaab’s Terrorist Attacks.” The Independent, 
October 6, 2013. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/illegal-ivory-trade-funds-
alshabaabs-terrorist-attacks-8861315.html 
This journal article describes the group’s involvement in ivory smuggling in east Africa. It    
identifies common smuggling routes and ports. The broader link between poaching and terror 
networks, as well as the challenges counterterrorism and law enforcement official’s face when 
confronting the issue, including corruption and lack of manpower are described.\ 
Piracy 
FUNDS FROM PIRACY/REPORTS ON RANSOMS 
World Bank. "Pirate Trails" Tracks Dirty Money Resulting From Piracy Off the Horn of Africa”: 
World Bank.. November 1, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2013/11/01/pirate-trails-tracks-dirty-money-resulting-from-piracy-off-the-horn-of-
africa 
This  press release states that between $339 million and $413 million was taken in ransom from 
the hijacking of ships off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa between 2005 and 2012, 
 27 
 
according to a report released by the World Bank. This study was carried out by the World 
Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL and reveals that much of 
the ransom money was used to fuel a wide range of criminal activities on a global scale.  
 
Karimi, Faith. “African pirates us millions of dollars in ransom on drugs, real estate, prostitutes.”  
CNN World,  November 2, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/world/africa/horn-of-africa-
piracy-loot/ 
This article by CNN shows the amount of money typically earned by different levels of pirate 
organizations based off of ransom money taken and their spending habits.  The lower level 
members earn between $30,000 and $70,000 per vessel. The article states that the “kingpins” 
earn the most money and often utilize it to finance future piracy operations, human trafficking 
and militias.      
 
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS 
“Last Hijack Trailer.” YouTube Video, 1:30. Posted by “Submarine Trailer” February 6, 2014.  
https://youtu.be/TaeC2NfUM7w 
A documentary movie made with a combination of interviews, animation and story telling that 
recounts the life of a Somali pirate.  This movie also covers aspects of the history of Somalia 
including the different tribal wars between the various clans and basic survival.  The main 
character, Mohamed recounts how he became involved in piracy and the aspects of that life 
along with the increasing difficulties he faces due to enhance security and anti-piracy efforts.   
See also, this additional clip from the movie. https://youtu.be/Va5hfin3Bvw 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PIRACY 
“Somalia’s Incredible Pirate Free-for-All.” YouTube Video, 19:07. Posted by “Journeyman Pictures”  
July,  2011.  https://youtu.be/oWRZfixUJik  
This brief documentary provides a look at some of the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the 
views of the pirates themselves, and the evaluation of current counter-piracy methods by outside 
countries.  The reporter interviews pirates, security officials, and local fishermen.  One of the 
highlighted problems is that the illegal overfishing of the area by various other countries had led 
to a lack of resources and some desperate fishermen turned to piracy as a result.  The security 
forces interview state that the piracy problem needs to be dealt with from the coast and not from 
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the sea and that they require aid in order to operate their own program as opposed to relying on 
foreign navies to interdict pirates.  The pirates that were interviewed describe the methods used 
to capture ships and the extent of the ransoms they have received.    
 
Murphy, Martin N. Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011. 
This book details the start of more overt and aggressive piracy off of Somalia when the targets 
shifted from local and foreign fishing vessels to larger commercial vessels, both local and 
international. 
 
 
Refugees 
Fleming, Melissa and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Yemen Arrivals Increase as 
Horn of Africa Mixed Migration Hits All-Time Highs.”  August 28, 2014. UNHCR.  
http://www.unhcr.org/503ca18c9.html 
This summary of UNHCR spokesperson, Melissa Fleming, remarks on the increased flow of 
refugees from the HOA to Yemen. Residents of Somalia who flee to other countries are being 
automatically classified as refugees due to the conflict in the area. During the first seven 
months of 2012 there was a 30% increase in refugees from HOA to Yemen and in 2011 over 
100,000 people made the crossing.  These trips can be dangerous due to the reliance on illegal 
boat crossings and smugglers.   
In regards to recent dangers faced and the treatment of the refugees during the crossings see 
the UNHCR article: 
UNHCR. “2014 becomes the deadliest year at sea off Yemen.” UNHCR. October 17, 2014. 
http://www.unhcr.org/544103b06.html 
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Part II: Regional and Western Efforts to Counter al-Shabaab 
 
HOA Counterterrorism/Law Enforcement 
HOA GOVERNMENT POLICIES/PROGRAM 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). http://amisom-au.org/ 
The official website of the coalition of African nations engaged in peacekeeping and CI/CT in 
Somalia.  Their website provides information about the mission, press releases and other documents.  
 
Horn of Africa. Civil Military Fusion Center. 
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Horn_of_Africa.aspx  
 
CIMIC’s archives of materials on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.  Works cover development, 
security, and governance issues. 
 
International Crisis Group. “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.” International Crisis 
Group, Africa Report no. 184. February 15, 2012. 
http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia  
This report analyzes Kenya’s October 2011 troop deployment in Somalia.  It identifies reasons 
for the intervention, including enhancing its border security, stopping the influence of Al-
Shabaab and to ease the flow of refugees.  There are some concerns that the deployment could 
result in the revisiting of old arguments and create new issues and possible lead to 
radicalization of Kenyan Somalis.   
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Also see the related ICG report, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization: 
http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation 
EVALUATION OF  CT EFFORTS 
Roble, Muhyadin Ahmed. “Al-Shabaab: On the Back Foot but Still Dangerous.” Terrorism Monitor 
13, no. 2 (2015): The Jamestown Foundation 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43441&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=56e57cc675de12b04908ef7a07a35e7f#.VMpwLv54rYg 
 
This article examines the impact of the Somali government and its allies capturing four major 
towns from Al-Shabaab.  Kenyan forces and a coalition of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, 
Uganda, and Ethiopia also re-captured several towns and villages.  A second offensive targeted 
the financial aspects of Al-Shabaab by retaking several coastal towns, including the port of 
Barawe, that were being utilized in the group’s multi-million dollar charcoal trade.  Despite 
facing setbacks in conventional fighting and in their finances, Al-Shabaab continued to launch 
targeted attacks at government buildings and at civilians and infrastructure.  The article 
concludes that Al-Shabaab shows signs of adapting to its more limited presence but shifting its 
tactics and finding new ways to raise funds.     
 
Reuters. “Coastal killings in Kenya pose insurgency risk for Kenyatta.”  Defence Web, July 11, 2014. 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35448&catid
=74&Itemid=30 
The article reviews the security threats in Kenya and evaluates the government’s response to 
 these issues.  Security concerns include the threat of militant groups including attacks by  
 al-Shabab and the discontent of coastal citizens in regards to their treatment and land  
  rights.  There is concern that a separatist movement may develop in the coastal area.  
 
West, Sunguta. “Kenya Unveils New Strategy for Tackling Terror.” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 19. 
(September 30, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/kenya-
unveils-new-strategy-tackling-terror/   
 
Kenya’s  recently announced National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NCVE) was 
designed with the goal of utilizing a collective of government, private sector, civil society and 
other areas to fully support CVE initiatives.  A focus on counter radicalization will be featured 
by the NCVE as opposed to former tactics that were often seen as controversial.   The 
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augmentation of the military response to al-Shabaab and other threats with counter 
radicalization/anti-recruitment efforts are aimed to prevent target sections of the population 
from joining these groups.   
 
ANTI-PIRACY 
OVERVIEW OF THREAT AND RESPONSE 
Alessi, Christopher and Stephanie Hanson. “Combating Maritime Piracy.” Council on Foreign 
Relations. March 23, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376    
 This article evaluates the threat of modern piracy and contains a section regarding the impact 
of      Somali piracy and the measures the international community has taken in order to 
counter the   problem. 
 
UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION  
United Nations. “Solving Somali piracy required effective state governance-UN.” Defence Web. 
October 31, 2014. 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36818:solvin
g-somali-piracy-requires-effective-state-governance--un&catid=108:maritime-
security&Itemid=233 
This news article on the decline of incidents regarding Somali piracy states that a recent 
decline in attacks is due to cooperation amongst the UN Member States and the maritime 
industry.  It is reminded that this is not a permanent solution and the attacks could return if the 
current policies and programs, with a focus on the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, 
are not attended to constantly.  Ultimately, it is concluded that if more countries and states act 
against piracy and more local growth and development is encouraged in areas impacted by 
piracy, continued progress can be seen. 
  
“European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) Somalia: Countering Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia.” EU NAVFOR.  http://eunavfor.eu/ 
This is the website of the European Union Naval Force Somalia.  The site provides information 
about the mission, facts and figures and latest news regarding the programs and operations of 
the EU NAVFOR Somalia.  
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U.S. RESPONSE TO GROWTH OF PIRACY 
Shapiro, Andrew J. “Piracy Off the Horn of Africa” Remarks to the Center for American Progress, 
Washington DC, March 27, 2012. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/186987.htm 
Andrew J. Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
spoke at the Center for American Progress in 2012 regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa. He 
spoke on the evolution of piracy into an organized operation, and U.S. response to Somali 
piracy covering both diplomatic engagement and expanding security.  Mr. Shapiro also 
explains the added security measures that the private sector and shipping companies can take to 
help deter piracy.     
 
 
 
 
RESPONSE AND ANALYSIS 
Reno, William. “Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia.” CTC Sentinel, April 29, 2013. 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/rethinking-counterinsurgency-in-somalia,  
This article covers the difficulties faced in organizing an effective counterinsurgency program 
between government and local militia forces. The author discusses shifting policies of the local 
government and how it can at times have connections to the militant groups it is fighting.  
Local militias also face cohesion difficulties due to politics and individual clan loyalties.  
Recommendations are made for managing different forces in a counterinsurgency program.       
Strategic Aspects and U.S. Policy 
IRREGULAR SECURITY THREATS/OVERVIEW 
Le Sage, Andre. “Africa’s irregular security threats: Challenges for US engagement.”  INSS CSR 
Strategic Forum, no. 255 (2010): 1-25. Institute for National Strategic Studies. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=116242  
This paper provides an overview of Africa’s irregular threats along with an analysis of their 
strategic impact on regional stability. Issues include, arms smuggling, terrorist and militant 
groups, drug trafficking, piracy, poaching, kidnapping and human trafficking, and several 
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environmental threats. The national security interests of the U.S. in the continent are discussed 
along with recommendations for enabling local government to address these security 
challenges. 
 
U.S. POLICIES AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS 
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) www.hoa.africom.mil 
The website of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa provides information about their 
mission, programs and work with local HOA partner-nations’ military forces. 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) www.africom.mil/newsroom/documents 
The website of the United States Africa Command provides information on their mission, 
partnership programs, operations and security cooperation. It also provides fact sheets and case 
studies along with transcripts of press briefings.  
 
Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Foreign Affairs  
92, no. 4    (2013): 32-43, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-
obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman  
This article argues that drone strikes are still a necessary part of counterterrorism operations. It 
also makes the case that, as unmanned capabilities proliferate among global actors, the U.S. 
government needs to identify a set policy in regards to drone usage on terrorist and terrorist 
targets and adhere to it.  
 
COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES 
Turbville, Graham,  Josh Meservey and James Forest. “Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in 
Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces.”  JSOU Report 14-1, Joint Special 
Operations University. February 2014. 
http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/al_Shabaab_Feb_2014%20PDF.pdf 
This report provides  brief overview of the history of Somalia and the formation of al-Shabaab 
and then proceeds to describe the funding and recruitment methods followed by the 
diminishment and evolution of al-Shabaab.  The majority of the report covers the different 
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challenges facing counterinsurgency in Somalia, the impact of current CI/CT efforts, and 
lessons based off of this research for U.S. Special Forces that could be utilized in that area. The 
ample selection of endnotes provides additional research areas. 
 
Healy, Sally and Ginny Hill. “Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks, and the 
Limitations of State-building.” Chatham House, October 2010. 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109494  
This paper compares the counterterrorism challenges presented by non-state actors in Yemen 
and Somalia. Both of these countries are marked by economic hardship, locally perceived 
ineffective governments, and the presence of illicit trade networks. U.S. intervention and actions 
can be deemed as attacks and threats by citizens of both countries and can lead them to siding 
with militant and radical groups.  This factor can outweigh the impact of the aid and nation 
building missions. The authors also advise awareness in regards to residents of both countries 
who have immigrated elsewhere.  They still have the possibility of becoming radicalized. There 
is also the concern regarding shadow business networks supporting these group 
 
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM/INSURGENCY POLICY 
Sheehan, Michael A, and Geoff Porter. "The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations In 
Africa." CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (2014): 1-3 https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-future-role-of-u-
s-counterterrorism-operations-in-africa 
This article begins by evaluating Operation Serval in 2012, an operation conducted by France 
and Chad with U.S. logistical support, and the lessons learned from it. In the wake of Operation 
Serval, concerns regarding the growth of new threats are directed at the poverty level and 
mismanaged and sometimes absent local governments. This combination of desperation and 
lack of government assistance/support could lead to the growth of militant groups. In addition, 
the various tensions between different religious and ethnic groups in these areas can be a factor 
as well. In conclusion, the author points out that coordination between different terror and 
militant groups across the continent should be monitored.  
 
Schmitt, Nicholas, Kulish, Eric, and Mark Mazzetti. “Target in U.S. Raid on Somalia Is Called Top 
Shabab Planner of Attacks Abroad.”  New York Times, Oct. 6, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/target-in-us-raid-on-somalia-is-called-top-
shabab-planner-of-attacks-abroad.html?_r=0  
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This article describes an unsuccessful October 2013 Navy SEALs raid in Somalia designed to 
capture Ikrimah, a top Shabaab militant. The importance of ensuring that the risks of the 
operations justify the results is discussed along with the message that the raid sent regarding the 
U.S.’s willingness to intervene.     
 
Schmitt, Eric and Mark Mazzetti. “Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike 
in Somalia.”  New York Times, October 28, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/africa/pentagon-says-shabab-bomb-specialist-is-
killed-in-missile-strike-in-somalia.html  
This article evaluates the October 2013 missile strike against Shabaab explosives specialist 
Ibrahim Ali as possibly indicative of a shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The 
authors express that there is some concern that these actions could serve to turn al-Shabab’s 
attentions to America. 
Lake, Eli. “Obama’s Not-So-Secret Terror War.” The Daily Beast, July 24, 2012. 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/24/obama-s-not-so-secret-terror-war.html  
This article summarizes a 2012 UN report outlining suspected covert U.S. counterterrorism 
activities in Somalia, including the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and the 
deployment of American forces.   
